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Introduction 
 
Andrew Marsham (University of Edinburgh) 
Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies 
University of Edinburgh 
19 George Square 
Edinburgh 
EH8 9LD 
andrew.marsham@ed.ac.uk 
 
Although both the Abbasid caliphs of Sunnism and the various Imams of Shi‘ism 
were members of the Prophet Muḥammad’s tribe of Hāshim, the descendants of 
Hāshim’s fraternal nephew Umayya dominated the Islamic world for most of its 
first century and went on to hold power in Spain for another 300 years.1 The 
Umayyad clan were said already to have been powerful in pre-Islamic Mecca, 
and their political success in Islam was swift: the third successor to Muḥammad, 
ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān (r. 644–656), was an Umayyad.2 Following five years of civil 
war (fitna), the leadership of the Muslim Empire remained in the hands of 
ʿUthmān’s Umayyad relatives, passing first to his second cousin, Muʿāwiya (r. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 That is, Muḥammad was said to have been the great-grandson of Hāshim b. ʿAbd Manāf, while 
the Umayyads were said to be descended from Umayya b. ʿAbd Shams b. ʿAbd Manāf, see, e.g. 
al-Zubayrī, Kitāb Nasab Quraysh ed. Évariste Lévi-Provençal (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1953), pp. 14, 
17, 97, 100–1. 
2 ʿUthmān was the great-grandson of Umayya b. ʿAbd Shams b. ʿAbd Manāf, and so also a third 
cousin of the Prophet Muḥammad in the male line; on his mother’s side, ʿUthmān was a first 
cousin of Muḥammad. See, e.g., al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, ed. M. al-Fardūs al-ʿAẓm 
(Damascus: Dār al-Yaqaẓa al-ʿArabīya, 1997–2004), V: 83. For the traditions about the status of 
the Umayyads and the wider clan of ‘Abd Shams at Mecca before Islam, see for example the list 
of the leading men of Quraysh in the Sīra: Ibn Hishām, Kitāb Sīrat Rasūl Allāh: Das Leben 
Muhammed’s nach Muhammed ibn Ishâk, ed. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld (Góttingen : Dieterichsche 
Universitáts-Buchhandlung 1858–60), p.187. 
661–680), who relocated the capital to Damascus in post-Roman Syria, and then, 
after a second civil war, to his first cousin once-removed, ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 685–
705; unchallenged 692–705). ʿAbd al-Malik, his progeny and nephews held power 
down to the Abbasid Revolution of 747–50, which brought about Umayyads’ fall 
and the rule of their Hashimite Abbasid cousins (r. 750–1258). The Umayyads’ 
Syrian armies were supplanted by soldiers recruited in the former Sasanian 
province of Khurasan and the imperial capital was moved to Iraq.3 However, the 
Umayyad dynasty retained its political role in Spain, where ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. 
Muʿāwiya (r. 756–788) took power. This ʿAbd al-Raḥmān claimed to be the great-
grandson of ʿAbd al-Malik. His Spanish Umayyad dynasty ruled as independent 
emirs, and then, after 924, as caliphs—rivalling the Abbasids of Baghdad and the 
Fatimids of North Africa and Egypt. The Umayyad dynasty fell in Spain in 1031, 
almost 400 years after the death of the Prophet.4 
The five papers on the Umayyads of Syria and Spain in this special edition 
of al-Masāq were all presented at the 2013 Leeds Medieval Congress. Together, 
they unsettle and challenge current consensus on the Umayyad dynasty, on the 
Umayyad periods in Syria and Spain, and on the Arabic historiography upon 
which we depend for much of our evidence for all three. Across the five pieces 
there is a focus on the contingent and contextual character of the written 
evidence. In this they reflect of course the broader historiographical currents of 
the last few decades; positivism has been supplanted by various perspectives 
that emphasise the social construction of culture and how all historical memory is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The best outline of events remains Gerald Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad 
Caliphate AD 661–750 (London: Croom Helm, 1986; 2nd edition, London: Routledge, 2000). 
4 See further below, Nicola Clarke, ‘Heirs and spares: elite fathers and their sons in the literary 
sources of Umayyad Iberia’. 
shaped by the present in which it is remembered.5 Furthermore (and related to 
this heightened historiographical awareness), there is a strong emphasis in these 
articles on perspectives that are partially concealed by the majority of our 
sources—concealment that has often increased by the biases and interests of 
modern historians. Many of the early Arabic sources were the products of 
imperial centres— Baghdad, Samarra and Córdoba—and so themselves 
construct the centrality of those centres against their ‘peripheries’.6 (And even 
other, more local, sources were in some respects products of the same centre-
periphery power relationship.7) The sources also tend to privilege other 
hegemonies, too—notably here, rulers over rebels and men over women.8  
The first paper, by Harry Munt, ‘Caliphal Imperialism and Ḥijāzī Elites in 
the Second/Eighth Century,’ issues twin challenges—to the dynastic terms in 
which early Islamic history is still usually conceived and to the dominant narrative 
of Umayyad imperial failure. Munt examines relations between the West Arabian 
province of the Ḥijāz, where both shrine towns of Mecca and Medina were 
located, and the imperial centre—first Umayyad Syria (661–683 and 692–750) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The literature here is of course vast. Hayden V. White, The Content of the Form: Narrative 
Discourse and Historical Representation (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) is a key 
contribution to this perspective. These trends have made their impact in late antique and 
medieval history, including Islamic history. See—to give just two recent examples—Thomas 
Sizgorich, Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity and Islam 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Nancy Khalek, Damascus after the 
Muslim Conquest: Text and Image in Early Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
6 The Iraqi focus of much early Islamic historiography is often noted, although the picture is 
complicated: Chase Robinson, Islamic Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), pp. xviii–xx. 
7 As Robinson puts it, ‘these [provincial] dynasties had a stake in patronizing the cultural patterns 
first mooted in Iraq, which, as far as learning was concerned, meant patronizing Arabic, Arabic 
letters or an Arabicized language’, ibid., pp. xviii–xx. 
8 Again, these concerns are of course part of a broader shift in subjects of historical concern: 
rebellion and revolt have been a source of interest to Marxist historians for a long time, and 
feminist and women’s history also now has a long tradition. In Islamic history, two recent 
contributions on these themes are: Patricia Crone, The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
and then Abbasid Iraq (after 750). Whereas there was only one major revolt that 
won substantial Ḥijāzī support during the Syrian Umayyad period—the so-called 
anti-caliphate of Ibn al-Zubayr (r. 683–692)—there were a series of revolts in the 
Ḥijāz after the Abbasid Revolution in 750. Three occurred in the 25 years 
between 762 and 786. As Munt observes, this is part of a pattern across the 
whole empire: ‘the Umayyad caliphs, at least after the second fitna, may actually 
have done a better job of convincing provincial elites of the imperial rationale 
than their early ʿAbbāsid successors’. In the Ḥijāz, the ‘provincial elite’ consisted 
of Meccans and Medinans, whose ancestors had been present during the 
founding decades of Islam and had presided over many of the Islamic conquests. 
They generally benefitted from the imperial project and recognised that their 
interests lay in supporting the ruling family, to whom, after all, they were closely 
related. Even in the tumultuous decades after the Abbasid revolution, only one of 
the three major Ḥijāzī revolts garnered substantial support. Indeed, one could 
almost suggest—although Munt does not explicitly push his argument this far—
that from the perspective of imperial power structures, the first Islamic empire 
might in some ways be better conceived as ‘Ḥijāzī’ rather than ‘Umayyad’ or 
‘Abbasid’. 
Majied Robinson’s ‘From Traders to Caliphs: Prosopography, Geography 
and the Marriages of Muḥammad’s Tribe’ also addresses how we should 
conceive of the ruling elite of the early Islamic empire. He argues that the data 
about the marriages made by Muḥammad’s tribe of Quraysh from the mid-6th 
century through to the mid-8th century, as preserved in the Kitāb Nasab Quraysh 
of al-Zubayrī (d. 851), is broadly accurate and so indicative of social change in a 
nascent and then developed empire. He further suggests that we do not abandon 
the tribe as a unit of social analysis: tribes are socially constructed, of course, but 
like all social constructs they matter as much as any simple material or biological 
reality.9 What the prosopographical data suggests is that the generation of 
Quraysh just before Muḥammad’s own married exogamously (i.e. outside 
Quraysh) relatively frequently (over 40% of recorded marriages). However, 
Muḥammad’s own generation married exogamously even more (more than 60% 
of recorded pairings). Furthermore, they married into a far wider range of tribes, 
from a much wider geographical area. This picture correlates with the new status 
achieved by the Ḥijāzī elite as the centre of a growing tribal federation and 
nascent empire in the 620s, 630s and 640s; Quraysh’s much more local 
marriages in the mid-to-late-6th century would suggest a more local political 
significance for the tribe. Finally, Robinson also analyses the marriages of the 
Umayyad caliphs and their sons (mid 7th- to mid-8th century). He shows that this 
ruling branch of Quraysh married exogamously far less than the other cohorts; 
fewer than 15% of their marriages were to non-Qurashīs, suggesting, he 
proposes, ‘an increasingly distant elite that no longer needed to marry into the 
leading families of the Islamic project in order to maintain their authority’.10 For all 
that the Umayyads were part of the wider Ḥijāzī imperial elite, being an Umayyad 
(or rather, being an Umayyad caliph or his son), did have consequences for 
relations with the wider society and thus for a sense of group identity. 
Like Robinson, Hagemann also considers what the later, 9th- and 10th-
century Arabic tradition can tell us about the first century of Islam, but she 
examines the narrative historical material recorded by al-Balādhurī (d. c. 892) 
and al-Ṭabarī (d. 923). And like Munt, Hagemann is interested in rebellion and 
what it can tell us. However, Hagemann is wary of drawing any positivist 
conclusions from her material; rather, she focuses on the ways that rebellions are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For some thought-provoking discussion of key literature on this topic, see Patricia Crone, ‘The 
Tribe and the State’, in The State: Critical Concepts ed. John A. Hall (London: Routledge, 1994), 
pp. 446–9. 
10 Below, ??. 
presented in the later sources. In ‘Challenging Authority: al-Balādhurī and al-
Ṭabarī on Khārijism during the Reign of Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān,’ Hagemann 
notes that almost all the extant historical reports (akhbār) on the so-called 
Kharijite rebellions during the reign of the first Syrian Umayyad caliph, Muʿāwiya 
are preserved only by al-Balādhurī or al-Ṭabarī, or both. She argues that the two 
scholars probably had access to similar material but made deliberate selections 
in order to make very different uses of the stories about the Kharjites.11 Al-
Balādhurī, as a courtier and man of letters, was interested in ‘ethics and morals’, 
as well as ‘entertaining stories’.12 His material includes startling stories of female 
rebels and uses the Kharijite rebels themselves almost approvingly in order to 
point up the Umayyads’ moral failings. Al-Ṭabarī, as a unity-minded (jamāʿī) 
religious scholar and student of the Muslim polity, was more concerned with 
‘statecraft and communal cohesion’;13 he condemns the Kharijites where they are 
in open rebellion but is more approving of non-militant Kharijites who were 
persecuted for their challenges to Umayyad misconduct.14  
The last two articles turn to Umayyad Spain. In ‘“They fled to their remote 
islands”: al-Ḥakam II and al-Majūs in the Muqtabas of Ibn Ḥayyān’, Ann Christys 
also proposes a more sceptical and historically-contextualised reading of the 
sources. She notes that al-Ḥakam II’s (r. 961–976) efforts to repel Viking raids 
are extant only in a mid-11th-century compilation by Ibn Ḥayyān (d. 1076). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See her comments on how al-Balādhurī appears to have been likely to have had access to 
materials from Abū Mikhnaf on the Kharjities, but to have chosen deliberately not to use them, ?? 
below. For some further discussion around source-criticism and the Kharijites, see Adam Gaiser, 
‘Source-Critical Methodologies in Recent Scholarship on the Kharijites’, History Compass 7.5 
(2009), 1376–90. 
12 Below, ??. 
13 Below, ??. For the term jamāʿī, see Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and 
History in a World Civilization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974), I:278; Patricia Crone, 
Medieval Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp. 28-9. 
14 As Hagemann notes, these conclusions match those arrived at by other scholars who looked at 
other case studies from the two compilers’ material, below ??. 
Whereas historians have tended to treat this material on the Vikings (Arabic, 
Majūs; Latin, Nordimanni) as simple factual evidence, Christys notes that—just 
as al-Balādhurī’s and al-Ṭabarī’s concerns lay elsewhere than the facts of 
rebellion in the 7th century—Ibn Ḥayyān focuses much more on al-Ḥakam II and 
his court than on the Vikings themselves. The elaborate ceremonial preparations 
at Córdoba and Madīnat al-Zahrāʾ for the annual campaigns against the raiders 
are described in detail; the raiders themselves and their impact scarcely figure at 
all. The impression is of 10th-century court propaganda descriptions of 
legitimating ceremonial parades preserved in the 11th-century history of Ibn 
Ḥayyān—himself of course a partisan of the (in fact now terminally imperilled) 
Umayyad cause.15 
Finally, in ‘Heirs and spares: elite fathers and their sons in the literary 
sources of Umayyad Iberia’, Nicola Clarke considers the anxieties around 
dynastic continuity as depicted in the chronicles of Ibn al-Quṭīya (d. 977), Ibn al-
Kardabūs (fl. 13th century) and Ibn al-Khaṭīb (d. 1374), which describe events in 
9th-, 10th- and 11th-century Spain. When read in the wider context of early Islamic 
literature on parenthood among the ruling elite, the chronicles’ message that 
successful lineages are founded upon diligent imitation of patriarchal example is 
accentuated. For example, a young ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muʿāwiya—the future first 
Umayyad emir of al-Andalus—is depicted by Ibn al-Quṭīya in attendance at an 
audience between his grandfather, the Syrian Umayyad Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik, 
and Sāra, the granddaughter of a former Visigothic king of Spain. Sāra seeks 
Hishām’s protection and assumes the status of his ward; the young orphan 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān is likewise represented as Hishām’s son in his father’s absence. 
In later life, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān is said to have been scrupulous in the protection 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Encyclopaedia of Islam ,  2nd. ed, (Leiden : Brill, 1960 [i.e. 1954]-2009),  
‘Ibn Ḥayyān’ (A. Huici Miranda). 
offered to Sāra at Córdoba. The decline of the dynasty in the early 11th century is 
blamed on the failure of a son to heed his father’s advice (and so also on a 
father’s failure to educate his son properly): al-Muẓaffar, son of the Umayyads’ 
vizier, al-Manṣūr (r. 981–1002) was profligate and arrogant, provoking a fatal civil 
war in the Spanish Umayyad caliphate; the contrast with Hishām’s relationship 
with ʿrel al-Raḥmān is clear. These stories and others bring to mind the Qābūs-
nāma of Kaykāvūs, an Iranian aristocrat of late 10th century, where the training 
necessary for aristocrats’ children was described.  
As Clarke observes in her conclusion, in the Umayyad world, as 
elsewhere, elite masculinity was socially constructed: ‘a presumption of 
masculine authority within the household shaped the way … rulers were 
described … and how … fathers related to their sons’.16 Being an Umayyad ruler 
was not something simply biologically determined, but rather something imagined 
and projected. Of course, this tension between social construction and material 
fact lies at the heart of all historiography but it is especially salient in the five 
pieces on the Umayyads and their memory that follow below. For Munt, ‘attitudes’ 
and ‘negotiation’ are central to the project of imperial dominion over others.17 The 
elite of the Ḥijāz were closely related to their rulers, whether from the Umayyad 
or Abbasid branch of Quraysh; the status they negotiated within the empire 
reflected these connections and their relative political quietism accorded with it. 
Robinson reminds us how such identities founded upon kinship were largely built 
upon marriage and reproduction, and shows that the later texts that promoted the 
memory and status of kin-groups can nonetheless be used to reconstruct these 
processes. In contrast, Hagemann and Christys focus on the contemporary 
concerns of our sources: the courtly and politico-theological interests of Iraqis in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Below, ??. 
17 Below, ??. 
the 9th and 10th century when they narrated resistance to past Umayyad rule, and 
the reiteration of past Umayyad military pomp in the very final decades of 
Umayyad power. Together, the articles point to an exciting future for the study of 
‘the first dynasty of Islam’,18 in which previously marginal perspectives are 
regained, and new approaches provide new answers to the perennial questions 
of dynasty and empire. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The phrase is, of course, Gerald Hawting’s, in his First Dynasty of Islam. 
